2019 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-21-2019

In re: Abdul Muhammed v. USA

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019

Recommended Citation
"In re: Abdul Muhammed v. USA" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 178.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/178

This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

Case: 19-1019

Document: 003113167687

Page: 1

BLD-101

Date Filed: 02/22/2019

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1019
___________
IN RE: ABDUL MUHAMMED,
Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.N.J. Crim. 1-16-cr-00476-001)
District Judge: Renee M. Bumb
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
February 14, 2019
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 22, 2019)
_________
OPINION *
_________

PER CURIAM
Abdul Muhammed filed this pro se petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking
review of District Judge Renée Marie Bumb’s refusal to recuse herself from presiding
over his criminal case. For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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In 2016, Muhammed was charged, by criminal complaint, with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He was subsequently indicted on federal drug charges and on
one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Although Muhammed has been
proceeding pro se in the District Court, he has also been appointed several attorneys to
serve as stand-by counsel.
Muhammed was initially appointed stand-by counsel from the Federal Public
Defender’s Office, which had to recuse due to a conflict. In March 2016, the Magistrate
Judge appointed Paul Sarmousakis as stand-by counsel. In August 2016, Muhammed
requested the appointment of new counsel, and the Magistrate Judge appointed David
Simon. In February 2017, Muhammed again requested the appointment of new counsel.
He alleged that, during a prison visit, Simon said “I see you going to a maximum jail and
me going home to watch the Seattle football game.” At a hearing on this issue, District
Judge Bumb allegedly told Muhammed that “I don’t think [Simon] said that to you.”
Muhammed claims that Judge Bumb “prejudged the issue,” as she did not take any
testimony from Simon, and she also said that “based on my observation from the facts
defendant has [chosen] not to cooperate with his attorney.” In any event, Judge Bumb
granted Muhammed’s request for new counsel, and appointed Martin Eisenberg. 1
In October 2018, Muhammed filed a motion to recuse Judge Bumb. In addition to
his allegations regarding Judge Bumb’s having prejudged the issue with Simon,

1

After another request from Muhammed for the appointment of new counsel, Judge
Bumb appointed Troy Archie, who is currently serving as Muhammed’s counsel.
2
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Muhammed alleged that Judge Bumb had shown “favoritism” to the government in ruling
on discovery motions. Muhammed alleged that after he requested that Judge Bumb
reconsider a discovery ruling, she showed hostility towards him and said “I’ve
reconsidered it. I stand by my order. There is nothing wrong with this order.”
Muhammed also alleged that Judge Bumb showed hostility towards him by requiring that
he file motions through his stand-by counsel. The District Court denied the recusal
motion. Muhammed then filed this mandamus petition.
Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to
“issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of [our jurisdiction] and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.” A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is properly
invoked only in extraordinary situations. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976). A petitioner seeking the writ “must have no other adequate means to
obtain the desired relief, and must show that the right to issuance is clear and
indisputable.” Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996). 2
Mandamus is a proper means to obtain review of the denial of a recusal motion
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155,

2

In his recusal motion filed in the District Court, Muhammed complained of delay
resulting from the District Court’s requirement that he file motions through counsel. He
does not seek mandamus relief on that issue. In any event, even though a writ of
mandamus may be warranted where a district court’s “undue delay is tantamount to a
failure to exercise jurisdiction,” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79, Muhammed has not shown that
the District Court’s requirement caused any such delay here. See also In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (matters of docket control are
committed to the district court’s discretion).
3
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163 (3d Cir. 1993). Under § 455(a), recusal is required when a “reasonable person, with
knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
and quotations omitted). In this regard, “[w]e have repeatedly stated that a party’s
displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.” Securacomm
Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
And judicial remarks, made in the ordinary course of a proceeding, that are “critical or
disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not
support a bias or partiality challenge.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Moreover, recusal is not required on the grounds of “unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation.” In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981).
Here, Muhammed has not made a persuasive case for mandamus relief. His
allegations that Judge Bumb showed favoritism to the government, and hostility towards
him, amount to nothing more than his dissatisfaction with Judge Bumb’s discovery
rulings. See Securacomm Consulting, 224 F.3d at 278. Muhammed’s allegation that
Judge Bumb prejudged his case is unsupported and speculative. See United States, 666
F.2d at 694. He points to a hearing in which Judge Bumb ultimately granted his request
for new counsel, a request he has made—and been granted—three times in this case.
Judge Bumb’s alleged comments at that hearing and at the discovery hearings are not out
of the ordinary, and are insufficient to show “such a high degree of favoritism or
antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. A reasonable
4
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person, with knowledge of all of these facts, would not reasonably question the
impartiality of Judge Bumb. See In re Kensington, 368 F.3d at 301.

5

